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1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).  See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411
(2003).  Grutter and Gratz both involved the constitutionality of the affirmative action policies in place at
the University of Michigan.  Gratz involved the policy applied at the undergraduate level, specifically the
College of Literature, Science and the Arts, while Grutter involved the policy applied at the university’s
law school.  Though the two schools’ affirmative action policies were different, and the Court came to
different results in each case, the rationale was the same in both and was set forth primarily in Grutter.
2. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346.
3. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346-47 (citations omitted).
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AN ALTERNATIVE TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:  ATTRIBUTING
LACK OF DIVERSITY IN UNDERGRADUATE INSTITUTIONS TO A
FAILING EDUCATION SYSTEM
Michele Sherretta*
In the recent Supreme Court decision, Grutter v. Bollinger,1 the Court
upheld the use of race-based affirmative action in admissions processes at
higher education institutions.  In the course of holding that diversity is a
compelling interest, and that narrowly tailored race-conscious programs may
be used to achieve diversity at graduate and undergraduate institutions, the
Court also noted that such “race-conscious admissions policies must be
limited in time.”2
It has been [twenty-five] years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education [in
Regents of University of California v. Bakke3].  Since that time, the number of minority
applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased.  We expect that [twenty-
five] years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today.4
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5. See, e.g., Gregory Kane, Affirmative Action?  No, Racial Preference, BALT. SUN, June 29, 2003,
at 3B; Terence J. Pell, Editorial, Camouflage for Quotas, WASH. POST, June 30, 2003, at A15; Abigail
Thernstrom, Opinion, College Rulings Add Insult to Injury; Court’s Upholding of Admissions Preference
Glosses over Need for Better Early Schooling, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at M1; and Opinion, What Do
U-M Court Rulings Mean?, DETROIT NEWS, June 24, 2003, at 11A.
6. Shane H. Freedman, Comment, Affirmative Action:  An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1579, 1621 (1997).
In the wake of the decision approving the continued use of race-based
affirmative action programs, many have questioned whether the Court has
made the right decision.5  This Note asserts that rather than debating the
effectiveness or appropriateness of affirmative action at the university level,
the focus should be on reforming the entire education system from the ground
up in order to achieve racial equality in educational institutions by “natural
representation, as opposed to artificial manipulation.”6  Currently, in
evaluating levels of minority enrollment in universities, the question to be
answered is:  How can admissions processes be changed to achieve diversity?
This Note attempts to demonstrate that the better question is:  What is causing
this disparity to occur in the first place, and how can we fix it?
Part I will give an overview of the current state of race-based affirmative
action plans and how the Supreme Court’s decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger affect these plans.  Part II discusses some proposed
race-neutral alternatives to traditional affirmative action plans, including
percentage plans and economic affirmative action, both of which are applied
during the admissions process at the university level.  Part III gives an
overview of the types of education finance reform that have been attempted
thus far across the country and how this reform will contribute greatly to
diversity at the university level.  This part examines the effects of school
choice, the use of property taxes to finance public schools, and litigation and
legislation mandating minimal standards of education.  Part IV discusses the
role that the racial achievement gap plays in education reform and what it will
take to narrow that gap.  Part V brings the above approaches together and
proposes a solution using social science methodology.  It suggests that
alternative dispute resolution processes may be more successful than litigation
at affecting a change in the way schools are run; and that such processes must
take place in each individual school district as opposed to at a state or national
level.  This part also suggests a sample model for a solution based on a
modified version of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.
Finally, this Note concludes by observing that great strides have been
made in improving the various aspects of the nation’s education system, but
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7. Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965).
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. The scope of this Note is limited to the use of affirmative action in the education, rather than
the employment, context.  The factors that create disparities in a particular employer’s workforce, requiring
employers to use voluntary affirmative action programs, may be different than those that create disparities
in the education context.
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.”).
11. Id.
12. Since the focus of this Note is examining the source of the lack of diversity at universities and
not remedying the past effects of specific instances of discrimination, the only compelling interest discussed
is diversity.  For a discussion of when remedying past discrimination can be appropriately used as a
compelling interest, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
each attempt, by itself, falls slightly short of its goal of attaining educational
equality.  Now—in the wake of the Court’s decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger—is the time to examine those efforts, their shortcomings, and find
a way to fix the system in its entirety.
I.  CURRENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
A.  A Brief History
Ironically, the term “affirmative action” was initially used in the context
of requiring entities that contracted with the federal government to take
“affirmative action” to ensure that employees or applicants were treated
without regard to factors such as race.7  But in the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education8 and the school desegregation which that case ordered, affirmative
action became known as a widely used method for colleges and universities
to obtain higher percentages of minorities by taking race into account in the
admissions process.9
The debate over affirmative action centers on the state’s ability to make
race a factor in admissions processes.  Under standard constitutional analysis,
race is a suspect class and thus, all race-based classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny.10  In other words, the use of race must both (1) serve a
compelling state interest; and (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.11  A state actor defending the use of race in its affirmative action
program typically cites one of the following as its compelling interest:  the
achievement of diversity or the remedy of past discrimination.12
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13. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
14. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331-32; Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2419-20.  The affirmative action plan
applied at the undergraduate school differs from that applied at the law school.  The undergraduate program
adds twenty points to a minority applicant’s overall score, thus changing what scores are required for
automatic admission or rejection from the school.  Id. at 2419.  However, the law school’s program only
seeks to achieve a certain percentage of minority students in the incoming class, and does so without
explicitly adding points to an applicant’s score.  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
15. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.  The “attainment of a diverse student body . . . clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”  Id.
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000); Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
17. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
18. Id. at 317.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 316-17.
21. Id. (alteration in original).
22. Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), which held that diversity is not a
compelling state interest, with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), which held
that it is.
On April 1, 2003, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in both Grutter and Gratz.13  These cases involved the University of
Michigan’s policy of using race as a factor in its admission process in the
hope of attaining a diverse student body.14  Since diversity was recognized in
Justice Powell’s opinion for the plurality of the Supreme Court in Bakke as a
“constitutionally permissible goal,”15 many schools across the country,
including the University of Michigan, have cited diversity as their justification
for applying race-based factors.16
The Bakke Court held that a university may not achieve the goal of a
diverse student body by the use of quotas, i.e., reserving a specific number of
seats for minority students,17 but may only consider race as a “plus” factor.18
By deeming race a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file, the school is not
insulating that candidate’s file from comparison with others and every
applicant is considered for all of the available seats.19  As an example of a
program that would pass constitutional muster, Justice Powell pointed to the
program Harvard had in place at the time (the “Harvard Plan”).20  The Harvard
Plan does not set quotas, but, because “of the necessity of including more than
a token number of black students . . . pays some attention to . . . [the] types
and categories of students” it admits.21
In the years between Bakke and Grutter, a split emerged among courts as
to whether Justice Powell’s opinion for the plurality in Bakke was binding
precedent on the issue of diversity as a compelling state interest.22  Last year,
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23. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617-18 (2002); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 602 (2002).
24. Gratz is not discussed here because the Court set forth its rationale for holding that diversity is
a compelling state interest in Grutter and applied that same rationale in Gratz.
25. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. at 2325, 2332 (2003).
26. Id. at 2331-32.
27. Id. at 2332.
28. Id. (quoting the admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School).
29. Id. (quoting the admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School).
30. Id. (quoting the admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School).
31. Id. at 2333.
32. Id.
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the cases of Grutter v. Bollinger and
Gratz v. Bollinger to resolve this issue.23
B.  Grutter v. Bollinger24
The plaintiffs in Grutter were white applicants who were denied
admission to the University of Michigan Law School and who alleged that the
school’s affirmative action policy discriminated on the basis of race in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1965.25  The policy at issue required admissions officials to consider all of
the information in a candidate’s file, including the student’s undergraduate
grade point average (GPA), Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score,
personal statement, and letters of recommendation.26  While GPA and LSAT
scores were a consideration under the policy, a high score would not guarantee
admission, and a low score would not automatically disqualify a candidate.27
The admissions policy was designed to “achieve that diversity which has
the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class
stronger than the sum of its parts.”28  Though the school did not limit the types
of “diversity contributions” that would be given substantial weight in the
admissions process, the policy reaffirmed the school’s “longstanding
commitment to . . . racial and ethnic diversity.”29  The policy placed special
importance on the inclusion of students from groups that have been
historically underrepresented, “like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native
Americans.”30  The school did not aim to enroll a particular number of
minority students, but rather aimed to have a “critical mass” of
underrepresented students.31  This “critical mass” was defined by the Director
of Admissions as “a number that encourages underrepresented minority
students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.”32
Representatives of the school also asserted that a critical mass could not be
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33. Id.
34. Id. at 2347.
35. Id. at 2337.
36. Id. at 2339.
37. Id.  See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 318-19 (1978).
38. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
39. Id. at 2340 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae American Educational Research Association et al.).
40. Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae United States).
41. Id. at 2342.
42. Id. at 2343.
43. Id.
achieved if the admissions committee relied primarily on GPAs and LSAT
scores, without taking race into consideration.33  After applying the traditional
two pronged strict scrutiny test, the Court held that the school’s affirmative
action policy both served a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored.34
The Court first addressed diversity and, for the first time since Bakke,
endorsed Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, which described diversity as a
compelling state interest.35  It cited two interrelated reasons for doing so.
First, the Court noted that its holding “is in keeping with [the] tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits.”36  Included in this deference is the freedom
of a university to choose its student body and the presumption that, absent a
showing to the contrary, good faith on the part of the university is presumed.37
The second reason the Court cited for holding that diversity is a compelling
state interest is that the educational benefits of diversity cited by the university
were substantial.38  These benefits include preparing students for a diverse
workforce39 and ensuring that educational institutions are open to students of
all races and ethnicities.40
The Court next held that the law school’s admissions policy was narrowly
tailored and fit into the model that Justice Powell set forth in Bakke.41  The
school’s goal of attaining a critical mass did not amount to a quota, since there
was no evidence that the admissions officials were aiming to achieve a
particular number of minority students.42  As evidence of this, the Court
pointed to the actual percentages of enrolled minority students, which varied
over the years in question from 13.5% to 20.1%, numbers the Court thought
were inconsistent with a quota.43  In addition to the lack of a quota, the
admissions program gave individualized consideration to each applicant
ensuring “that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way
that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her
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44. Id.
45. Id.  For more details of the affirmative action policy applied at the undergraduate level of the
University of Michigan see Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2418-20 (2003).
46. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
47. Id.
48. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344.
49. Id. at 2344-47.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2345.
52. Id. at 2346.
53. Id.
application.”44  This is in contrast with the program applied at the
undergraduate level, at issue in Gratz, which automatically awarded twenty
points to an applicant’s admissions score based on race.45  This award of
twenty points effectively served to isolate minority candidates’ applications
from competition with other students, thereby preventing the program from
being narrowly tailored.46  The Court struck down the undergraduate program
on this basis.47  The Grutter Court also held that there was ample evidence that
the law school gave considerable weight to diversity factors other than race,
including fluency in other languages, overcoming adversity, exceptional
community service and established careers in other fields.48
The Court also set forth a brief discussion of race-neutral alternatives to
race-based affirmative action policies and asserted that the race-based policies
approved in its decision must be limited in time.49  The race-neutral
alternatives that the Court mentioned were a lottery system, the lowering of
admissions standards, and percentage plans.50  The Court found a common
problem with all three:  each would force the school to sacrifice its
educational mission of achieving all kinds of diversity, not just racial
diversity.51  However, it subsequently recognized the importance of race-
neutral alternatives when it stated that race-based affirmative action programs
must have a “logical end point.”52  “Universities in California, Florida, and
Washington State, where racial preferences in admissions are prohibited by
state law, are currently engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of
alternative approaches.  Universities in other states can and should draw on
the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they
develop.”53  It is with a vision toward the end of race-based affirmative action
that this Note continues.
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54. The question of whether diversity is a compelling interest at the primary school level was not
addressed by the Supreme Court and thus remains undecided.  For a discussion of diversity at the primary
school level, see generally Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1999) (arguing that race-based admissions
programs for elementary and secondary schools should survive strict scrutiny because the special
characteristics of those schools make achieving a diverse student body a compelling interest).
55. Though there are several states that now prohibit the consideration of race in admissions
procedures, the only three examined in this note are California, Texas, and Florida.
56. In each of these states, California, Florida, and Texas, students retain the option of traditional
admission procedures which use a student’s GPA and standardized test scores to determine eligibility for
admission.  For a fuller discussion of the percentage plans imposed in each of these three states, see U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, Beyond Percentage Plans:  The Challenge of Equal Opportunity in Higher
Education, at http://www.usccr.gov (last visited Jan. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Beyond Percentage Plans].
57. Id.
II.  RACE-NEUTRAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS
The two most commonly offered alternatives to race-based affirmative
action plans are percentage plans and economic affirmative action; both race-
neutral attempts at achieving diversity.  Though each is discussed separately
below, it should be kept in mind that a holistic approach to diversity may
require taking aspects of each plan and using them together.  A third
alternative to traditional affirmative action plans is to apply race-based
preferences at the primary school level instead of the undergraduate level.54
Because this Note proposes that diversity can be achieved without race-based
preferences, this option is not addressed.
A.  Percentage Plans
A few states have abolished race-based affirmative action plans and
replaced them with what are commonly referred to as percentage plans.55
Though the specifics of each plan vary by state, the basic structure of each
plan is that the top ranking seniors of every high school in the state
automatically gain admission to state colleges and universities, regardless of
the students’ scores on standardized tests such as the SAT or ACT, and also
regardless of their race.56
Percentage plans were first used by California’s state university system
as early as 1960, but only in conjunction with race-based affirmative action
programs.57  That plan, not mandated by the state, provided automatic
admission into the state university system for students who were among the
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58. Id.
59. Id.
60. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) reads:  “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”
61. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996).
62. See id.
63. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (2003) provides:
Each general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant for admission to the institution
as an undergraduate student if the applicant graduated with a grade point average in the top 10%
of the student’s high school graduating class in one of the two school years preceding the academic
year for which the applicant is applying for admission and the applicant graduated from a public
or private high school in this state accredited by a generally recognized accrediting organization or
from a high school operated by the United States Department of Defense.
64. The program was initiated by Governor Jeb Bush when he signed Exec. Order No. 99-281,
available at http://sun6.dms.state.fl.us/eog_new/eog/orders/1999/november/eo99-281.html (last visited
Jan. 9, 2004), which banned the use of race or ethnicity in university admissions decisions in the State of
Florida.
65. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C-6.002(5) (2003) provides:
A student applying for admission who is a graduate of a public Florida high school, has completed
nineteen required high school units, . . . ranks in the top 20% of his/her high school graduating
class, and who has submitted test scores from the Scholastic Assessment Test of the College
Entrance Examination Board or from the American College Testing program shall be admitted to
a university in the State University System.
top 12.5% of high school graduates statewide.58  In addition to that, the
university would offer admission to the top 4% of graduates from every high
school in the state.59  In 1996, these programs became the sole form of
affirmative action when California voters passed Proposition 209, which
amended the state’s constitution to prohibit race-based affirmative action
programs.60
Texas followed suit in 1998 after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood
v. Texas, which held that diversity was not a compelling state interest.61  The
Hopwood holding thus prohibited race-based preferences in the state.62  The
Texas legislature enacted the state’s percentage plan in response.  Under the
Texas plan, if an applicant to a Texas state college or university graduated
high school with a grade point average in the top 10% of his or her class, that
applicant had to be admitted to the school, regardless of standardized test
scores.63
One year later, Florida instituted its Talented 20 Program.64  Florida’s
statute provides that a student who graduated from one of Florida’s public
high schools in the top 20% of his or her class and who provided standardized
test scores, must be admitted to a university in the state system, regardless of
what his or her standardized test scores are.65
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66. Though none of the legislation mandating these programs speaks directly to the issue of graduate
admissions, the language does refer to percentages of high school classes, not undergraduate classes, thus
allowing an inference regarding inapplicability to graduate schools to be made.  See CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 31(a); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C-6002(5) (2003); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (2003).
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Grutter refused to consider percentage plans as a feasible race-neutral
alternative to race-based affirmative action because of the failure of the plans to describe their applicability
at the graduate school level.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. at 2325, 2345 (2003).
67. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345.
68. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000); and Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
69. See discussion of the achievement gap infra Part IV.
70. See discussion of the achievement gap infra Part IV.
71. Michelle Adams, Isn’t It Ironic?  The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,”
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1734 (2001).
While these plans propose a “blind” admissions process, they are fairly
new and it is not yet clear whether they will be effective in achieving
meaningful levels of diversity.  In addition, upon further examination, their
flaws are apparent and troublesome.
First, these plans only provide a basis for admission to undergraduate
schools, leaving admission to graduate schools unaddressed.66  The Supreme
Court took note of this in Grutter, and further commented that “even assuming
such plans are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting
the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is
not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the
university.”67  As medical and law schools have been a major source of the
litigation that has ensued over affirmative action policies,68 one has to wonder
how the goal of diversity at these institutions will be achieved.  Graduate
schools, especially specialized schools that train for a particular profession,
like law or medicine, may rely heavily on standardized test scores, such as the
LSAT or MCAT, to predict the future success of applicants.  Without race-
based preferences, graduate schools are likely to place even more weight on
standardized testing, which tends to produce lower scores for minorities.69
This extra reliance on numbers will likely cause any level of diversity the
school has currently attained to drop quickly.70
As author Michelle Adams pointed out, a second problem with these
plans is that they rely on the segregation of the state’s high schools for their
success.71  For example, if there are ten high schools in a given locality, and
five of those (50%) are attended primarily by a given minority, if the top 10%
of all ten schools is offered automatic admission, 50% of those students likely
will be minorities.  Percentage plans do not attempt to remedy the problem of
segregation that exists in many areas around the country.  Therefore, if a
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72. See id.
73. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C-6002(5) (2003); TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (2003).
74. Beyond Percentage Plans, supra note 56; William E. Forbath & Gerald Torres, Merit and
Diversity After Hopwood, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 185 (1999); David Montejano, Ph. D., Access to the
University of Texas at Austin and the Ten Percent Plan:  A Three Year Assessment, at http://www.utexas.
edu/student/research/reports/admissions/Montejanopaper.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); Statistics for
minority enrollment at the University of California can be found on its website, University of California
Freshman Admits from California Fall 1997 through 2002, at http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/2002/
admissions_ethnicity.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); Statistics for the State of Florida can be viewed at New
FTIC Minority Students Enrolled Summer and Fall Terms, available at http://www.myflorida.com/
myflorida/government/otherinfo/ppts/enrollment2.ppt (last visited Jan. 9, 2004).
75. See Forbath & Torres, supra note 74, at 187; see also Samuel Autman, Minority Admissions Up
at UC Campuses, SAN DIEGO UNION—TRIB., Apr. 4, 2001, at A3.
76. Forbath & Torres, supra note 74, at 190 n.26.
77. Id. at 187.
78. For example, one possible problem that has yet to be seen is that state schools which were
considered competitive prior to percentage plans may be seen as less competitive.  This is especially true
for those schools which traditionally require high SAT scores for admission.  If the public makes the
presumption that these competitive state schools are now less prestigious it could create a market for private
schools, and consequently drive up the price of undergraduate education.
state’s high schools were to be integrated, the results with the percentage plan
are likely to be the same in terms of racial diversity, as they would be without
any affirmative action plan.72
The possibility of dramatic decreases in minority enrollment is another
key criticism of percentage plans.  None of the plans currently in place address
what happens if minority populations at the university level drop.73  In light
of these concerns, some effort has been made to determine the effectiveness
of these plans in achieving diversity.74  While the results vary from state to
state and from study to study, some observations can be made.  First, a
recurring problem is that even though percentage plans make more minorities
eligible for admission to state universities, only a fraction of those students
apply for admission and even less actually enroll.75  One author reports that
60% of African American students in Texas who attend college do so out of
state.76  Additionally, even if students do remain in the state for undergraduate
education, many students find that schools in the state university system are
either too far away or too expensive when compared with their local
community colleges.77
Since percentage plans are still fairly new, it is best to assume that the list
of problems above is not all-inclusive.78  One study showed that sole reliance
on percentage plans to achieve diversity may backfire.  A report compiled by
the United States Civil Rights Commission revealed several problems.  First,
some students who meet eligibility requirements under percentage plans attend
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79. Beyond Percentage Plans, supra note 56, Chapter 6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. But see Adams, supra note 71 (arguing that percentage plans will succeed in achieving higher
levels of minority enrollment where high schools remain segregated).
83. On the other hand, these students are the same ones that may be less prepared for college and
thus required to attend summer sessions as a condition of their admission to state schools.
84. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
failing high schools and may not be prepared for the academic demands of
college.79  In response to this, schools may require students who do not meet
minimum standards on preliminary testing to enroll in summer preparatory
courses.  However, this may only serve to further intimidate such students and
discourage them from attending.  On the opposite end of the spectrum,
students in competitive high schools whose grades put them just beyond
eligibility requirements wind up competing for limited seats, when they may
have easily qualified if they attended a less competitive neighboring school.80
A second problem that the study uncovered is that it may be safe to assume
that most of the students in the top percentages of their high schools would
have gained admission to state universities even without percentage plans.81
Consequently, the use of percentage plans at some schools does not have any
greater effect on minority enrollment at undergraduate institutions than the use
of standard admissions procedures, such as GPA and SAT scores.  Students
in the top 10% of their class are the same students with the highest GPAs and
SAT scores.82  However, percentage plans may have a big effect at schools
that function with below average standards, where students may not be
prepared to compete with students from better schools on standardized tests.83
However, it remains to be seen what weight will be assigned to these
problems and what solutions will be proposed to counter them.  Some of these
problems may be alleviated if states were to supplement percentage plans with
other initiatives, such as replacing the use of standardized testing with more
comprehensive admissions processes, and increasing the use of programs that
reach socially and economically disadvantaged students.
B.  Economic Affirmative Action
In addition to percentage plans, some have suggested that universities
should give more weight to an applicant’s socioeconomic background in the
admissions process.  Unlike race, class or socioeconomic status is not a
protected class and classifications that discriminate on the basis of wealth are
therefore not subject to strict scrutiny.84  The premise of economic affirmative
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85. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1913 (1996) (discussing three types of affirmative action:  merit-based, transformative, and
non-merit-based).
86. Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables:  Too Tough? Not Tough Enough,
5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 410-11 (1987) (“[A]ny preferences given should be directly related to the
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87. Id. at 411.
88. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure:  “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take
Account of Race,” 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 156 (1979).
89. Fallon, supra note 85, at 1926-27.
90. Id. at 1926.
91. Id. at 1925.
92. Id. at 1925-26.
93. Id. at 1926.
action is that due to the often high correlation between minorities and low
socioeconomic status, using socioeconomic status as a plus factor in
admissions may contribute towards creating a diverse student body.85
Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, prior to
their ascension to the bench, both articulated their approval of this idea.
Justice Thomas was of the opinion that economic-based affirmative action,
unlike race-based affirmative action, responds directly to “burdens that have
been unfairly placed in . . . individual’s paths.”86  In his critique of race-based
affirmative action plans, Justice Thomas goes on to note that “[t]he temptation
to do things the easy way is always great, but before we succumb we should
remember these victims, and then choose the tougher course that promises to
yield genuine and lasting equal opportunities.”87  Justice Scalia also stated his
approval of economic affirmative action:  “I strongly favor—what might be
called . . . ‘affirmative action programs’ of many types of help for the poor or
disadvantaged.”88  But critics of economic affirmative action are worried that
distinctions based strictly on socioeconomic status may be overbroad.
Professor Richard Fallon of Harvard Law School questions whether this
type of affirmative action program should be based on economic criteria
alone, or whether it should include another inquiry into the presence of
conditions commonly associated with poverty.89  He notes that “not all of the
disadvantages associated with poverty are caused or constituted by poverty.”90
Some of the disadvantages typically associated with severely impoverished
conditions include below average physical health and development,91 slow
intellectual development,92 and underdeveloped character and work habits.93
However, as Professor Fallon observes, a student could grow up in a very poor
family that provides a nurturing environment resulting in the development of
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97. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (2001)).
98. Council for Opportunity in Education, What is TRIO?, at http://www.trioprograms.org/
abouttrio.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2004).
99. These include Talent Search, Upward Bound, Upward Bound Math Science, Veteran’s Upward
Bound, Student Support Services, Educational Opportunity Centers and the Ronald E. McNair Post-
Baccalaureate Achievement Program.  Id.
100. Id.
101. Christian Sundquist, Equal Opportunity, Individual Liberty, and Meritocracy in Education:
Reinforcing Structures of Privilege and Inequality, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 227, 244-45 (2002).
See also U.S. Department of Education, A Profile of the Federal TRIO Programs:  2002, available at
http://www.ed.gov/programs/triotrain/trioprofilebrochure2002.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); Teresa Moore,
Concern for Upward Bound Program Cuts Feared in Highly Successful Class Based College Prep Project,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1995, at A13.
positive character traits and a strong work ethic.94  “Conversely, someone
growing up in a household well above the poverty line could encounter some
of the most important disadvantages commonly linked to poverty.”95  But
Professor Fallon also expresses the concern that economic affirmative action
plans may not accurately compensate for these disadvantages if they grant
preference based on current economic conditions determined through
something like submission of tax returns.96  However, this concern may be
somewhat alleviated through the use of admissions essays, which provide the
applicant with an opportunity to describe circumstances not easily ascertained
through the application itself, such as childhood poverty.
In addition to just taking socioeconomic status into account at the college
admissions stage, programs that work with students from low income
backgrounds throughout primary school, to prepare them for a college
education, must also be utilized.  The Higher Education Act of 196597 created
the TRIO programs (initially there were only three) which provide
disadvantaged students with educational support.98  TRIO now consists of
many different programs designed to meet the needs of low income and
disabled students.99  Beginning with students in the sixth grade, the Talent
Search program provides educational counseling to approximately 2,000
students.100  One of the better known TRIO programs is Upward Bound, which
provides tutoring, counseling, and other services to high school students from
low income families or potential first-generation college students.101  Upward
Bound only counsels about sixty students, but works with them for longer
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105. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES:  CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOO LS
(1991) (documenting the conditions that children face in impoverished inner city schools throughout the
country).
106. Kozol describes his encounter with a teacher in Irvington, New Jersey who stated:
[E]leven classes in one school don’t even have the luxury of classrooms.  They share an
auditorium in which they occupy adjacent sections of the stage and backstage areas.  “It’s very
difficult . . . to have concert rehearsals with the choir” while ten other classes try to study in the
same space.  “Obviously. . . there is a problem with sound . . . .”
“I’m housed in a coat room,” says a reading teacher at another school in Irvington.  “I teach,”
says a music teacher, “in a storage room.”  Two other classes, their teachers say, are in converted
coal bins.  A guidance counselor says she holds her parent meetings in a closet.
Id. at 159.
107. An eleventh grade student in Camden, New Jersey describes her experience:
You see this book? [The student displayed a paperback book with no cover and pages falling out].
We have to read Charles Dickens.  That’s the book they gave me.  Pages are missing. . . .  We don’t
even have enough for every student.  There are just ten students in the class! . . . Ten people!  They
had only seven books!  Why are we treated like this?
Id. at 154.
periods of time than students in other TRIO programs like Talent Search.102
These programs are valuable, but are not enough.  One author notes that these
programs, “by focusing solely on expanding opportunity for underprivileged
students . . . fail to limit the effects of background conditions.”103  In other
words, despite an individual student’s motivation to achieve and academic
ability relative to the other students in his or her school, that student may still
not succeed in attending college if he or she attends a failing high school and
is burdened with those disadvantages traditionally associated with
impoverished conditions.  Essentially, these programs “end up reifying
privilege by creating an illusion of equal opportunity.”104
These programs may best be considered in the context of an individual
community’s particular needs.  Federal programs, while serving an important
function, cannot cater to each community’s or, for that matter, each family’s
educational needs.  Supplemental educational and mentoring programs are an
important part of any effort to reform an education system.
III.  REFORMING THE NATION’S EDUCATION SYSTEM
The conditions in which many of the nation’s students attend school are
deplorable.105  As it stands, there are students who attend schools in urban
areas which are overcrowded and understaffed.106  The problem is exacerbated
when many children do not even have books107 and attend school in buildings
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108. A teacher at a Bronx high school notes that the school “does everything an inanimate object can
do to keep children from being educated.”  Id. at 99.  Kozol describes:
Blackboards . . . are “so badly cracked that teachers are afraid to let students write on them for fear
they’ll cut themselves.  Some mornings, fallen chips of paint cover classrooms like snow . . . .
Teachers and students have come to see humor in the waterfall that courses down six flights of stairs
after a heavy rain.”
One classroom . . . has been sealed off “because of a gaping hole in the floor.”  In the band
room, “chairs are positioned where acoustic tiles don’t fall quite so often.”  In many places, “plaster
and ceramic tile have peeled off” the walls, leaving the external brick wall of the school exposed.
Id. at 99-100 (quoting Overview of Morris High School, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1988).
109. 136 CONG. REC. S14991 (1990) (discussing the Urban Schools of America Act, § 3183).
110. See infra Part III.A.
111. See infra Part III.B.
112. See infra Part III.B.
that are unsafe.108  The results of these conditions are clear:  students walk
away from their primary school education with lower than average reading
skills and overall poor academic performance.109
But the path leading toward the goal of attaining a completely equal
education system contains many substantial “social” obstacles.  The first of
these is wrapped around the Establishment Clause.  Many attempts at reform
involve removing children from failing public schools and placing them in
private schools; a move many see as religiously motivated.  A second obstacle
to equal education, what I refer to as the “Robin Hood Phenomenon,” has
reared its head in education finance litigation.  Most education finance reform
platforms suggest that the excess funds from wealthier school districts should
be used to fund poorer school districts.  This “rob the rich to feed the poor”
approach requires some individuals to take responsibility for the acts or
misfortunes of others.  Concepts of individual autonomy may be at odds with
such distributive approaches.
Despite these obstacles, parents of students in failing schools, in
conjunction with state legislatures, have made continued efforts to improve
their children’s education by trying one thing at a time.  The first step was to
offer parents increased options in terms of choosing to which schools they can
send their children.110  Some parents, who refused to send their children to
other schools or for whom “school choice” was impractical, initiated litigation
seeking more money to improve the schools their children already attended.111
If attempts at achieving equalized funding were unsuccessful, some parents
sought to establish a state mandated minimum level of education, below which
the schools could not go.112  The pros and cons of each of these approaches are
outlined in separate sections below, but each effort at reform should be viewed
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117. See generally John C. Goodman, School Choice vs. School Choice, 45 HOW. L.J. 375 (2002)
(arguing that America’s school choice system is unfair and inefficient and in effect discriminates on the
basis of wealth and race).
as important as the others, with a goal of integrating these approaches kept in
mind.
A.  School Choice
To date, there have been several attempts to equalize educational
opportunities among different races and classes by providing parents with a
choice of schools for their children to attend.113  School choice plans can be
traced back to the years following Brown v. Board of Education,114 when
parents were given the choice of removing their children from poor,
ineffective, or segregated schools, and moving them to more effective,
wealthier, or integrated schools.115  But simply providing the choice to parents
may not be enough.116  The ability of many families to participate in school
choice programs is often affected by two things:  money and insufficient
options.117
John Goodman, President of the National Center for Policy Analysis,
offers an example of how the school choice problem begins:
[N]ot all families can afford to participate in the current system.  A study by
researchers at Southern Methodist University and the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
found that North Dallas houses near higher-ranking elementary schools sold for about
twenty percent more than houses near lower-ranking schools.  The authors conclude that
the market for education works surprisingly well.  Parents can discern the quality and the
market charges a premium for it.
This conclusion is supported by an informal survey . . . of housing prices in Highland
Park—a wealthy Dallas suburb.  Most Highland Park homes are inside the Highland Park
Independent School District (HPISD); however, a few are in the Dallas Independent
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119. Id. at 375.
For example:  a typical family living in Dallas can choose to live in any of the seventy-nine school
districts within fifty miles of downtown Dallas.  If each district has at least two campuses at each
grade level, a typical family has a choice of about 158 public schools—provided the parents can
afford to buy a house in any neighborhood and are willing to drive a considerable distance to work.
Id.
120. VITERITTI, supra note 113, at 65.
121. Id.
122. Id.  Some charter schools may be released of all local regulations except for those pertaining to
civil rights, health, and safety.  Id.
123. Id. 
124. Id.  For example, in 1995, a Los Angeles charter school, Edutrain, had its charter revoked for
financial mismanagement.  Id.
125. Magnet schools are an additional option available in some areas.  These schools tend to have
concentrated curriculum, such as math or science, and are developed with one or both of two goals in mind:
School District (DISD).  [A]ll else being equal, homes on the HPISD side of the street
sell for twenty-four percent more than those on the DISD side.  This implied that many
Highland Park homeowners were paying $72,000 just for the right to send their children
to Highland Park schools.118
This example demonstrates how the housing market is inextricably intertwined
with any given area’s system of school choice.  Parents with enough money
can theoretically choose any school district among a number in their state.119
But what about those for whom school choice is impractical?
i.  Charter Schools
Some parents, for whom the choices of schools in their area were
insufficient, created their own schools.  In order for a charter school to be
created, the state must pass a law permitting charter schools and the school
must have a sponsoring group.120  This group could be educators, parents, a
non-profit agency or other group that gets the state’s approval.121  This newly
created school is given great autonomy in terms of enrollment, dress codes,
length of the school day, and most things that are usually determined by local
school boards.122  But in return, it will be held accountable for meeting certain
standards, usually relating to academic or financial criteria.123  If the school
defaults from the standards set by the state, its charter may be revoked.124
Funding for these schools is typically taken from the local public school
system in proportion to the number of students enrolled.  In other words,
charter schools could be created if a group of parents in a local public school
system decide they want to take the per pupil expenditures that the school
district allocates for each of their children and start a new school.125
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creating a place for students who are focused on certain areas to develop those skills, and also to attract
minorities.  Critics of magnet schools complain that too much funding goes to magnet schools to develop
unique programs, when that funding could have been spread among schools with inadequate funding.  For
additional discussion, see Kimberly C. West, A Desegregation Tool that Backfired:  Magnet Schools and
Classroom Segregation, 103 YALE L.J. 2567 (1994).  
126. In 2000, there were 2,069 charter schools operating in the U.S., but over half of those schools
were found in five states:  Arizona, California, Michigan, Texas, and Florida.  Goodman, supra note 117,
at 380.  
127. Martha M. McCarthy, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris:  A Victory for School Vouchers, 171 ED.
LAW REP. 1 (2003).
128. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
129. Id. at 644-45.
130. Id. at 645.
131. Id. at 647.
While charter schools provide incentive for both the charter school and
the remaining schools to improve standards and attract students, the
previously existing public schools are left without adequate funding to do so.
Furthermore, not all state legislatures permit charters, causing charter schools
to be clustered in certain areas around the country.126  As such, this option is
not yet available to everyone.
ii.  Vouchers
Vouchers are, on their face, a seemingly simple solution to the problem
of failing public schools.  The standard voucher program provides a
designated amount of money for each child’s education at the private or public
school of his or her choice.127  Vouchers purport to provide families, who
otherwise could not afford a private school education, with the opportunity to
send their children to these schools.  The Supreme Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of vouchers in the face of First Amendment Establishment
Clause challenges in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.128
At issue in Zelman was a program initiated by the State of Ohio that
provided financial assistance to families in any school in Cleveland which was
under the state’s control.129  The two types of assistance offered were tuition
aid for students to attend the private school of the parent’s choice, or tutorial
aid for students who chose to remain in public schools.130  In the 1999-2000
school year, forty-six of the fifty-six private schools that participated in the
program were religiously affiliated.131  The program was challenged by a
group of taxpayers who claimed that it violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment because it had the primary effect of advancing
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religion.132  The Supreme Court held that “any objective observer familiar
with the full history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view
it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed
schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.”133  The
Court further noted the distinction between programs that provide aid directly
to religious schools and those in which government aid only reaches religious
schools as a result of the independent choices of private individuals.134
Though voucher programs may be constitutional, they are not without
their problems.  Primarily, vouchers may not be offered to all students.  Under
the Ohio plan at issue in Zelman, only children who attend “failing”135 schools
are provided with vouchers.  But how many students in schools that are under
par but yet do not qualify as “failing” are left behind?  This issue may have
been partially addressed with the No Child Left Behind Act.136  Enacted in
2002 by President George W. Bush, this Act provides that a school which does
not meet its annual progress objectives must provide educational options to its
students.137  The Act essentially forces schools in failing districts to adopt
programs similar to the voucher program in Zelman.  But another problem
with voucher programs remains.  Many families, even after they receive
vouchers, will still be financially unable to send their children to private
schools.  Most vouchers do not provide parents with the entire tuition amount
for a private school; parents must come up with the balance.  For example, in
Zelman, families whose income falls below 200% of the poverty line are
eligible for 90% of tuition and the parent’s co-payment is limited to $250.138
But all other families are provided with only 75% of tuition costs and there is
no cap on the parents’ co-payment.139
Though critics have noted that voucher programs may “create government
entanglement with religious institutions, increase economic and racial
segregation across schools, and have negative consequences for public
schools’ democratizing function,”140 they may provide much needed assistance
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for parents who want to send their children to private schools but cannot
afford full tuition.  Nonetheless, the central idea behind vouchers, that failing
schools will be forced to improve through competition, must be questioned.
Failing schools cannot compete when its students, and consequently its funds,
are slowly filtered into better schools.  In essence, by moving children to
better schools, the possibility of improving these failing schools is foreclosed.
Not every parent has been willing to give up so easily; efforts to improve
existing schools have been undertaken for years.
B.  Finance Reform
School financing schemes were first challenged in the 1960s in response
to the “white flight” and population shifts that occurred after the
desegregation orders of Brown v. Board of Education.141  The primary
argument of those seeking finance reform is that relying on local property
taxes to fund local public schools is inherently unfair and violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142  Essentially the problem
is that school districts with low tax bases can never raise money in amounts
comparable to wealthy districts, no matter how high their tax rates.  Since the
Supreme Court in Brown based its decision and desegregation orders on the
importance of education,143 it seemed logical to many that education would be
declared a fundamental right under the United States Constitution.
Deprivation of such right would, therefore, be subject to strict scrutiny.  In
1971, the California Supreme Court adopted this approach in striking down
the state’s school financing system in Serrano v. Priest.144  The court stated
that the current system “conditions the full entitlement to [education] on
wealth, classifies its recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and
makes the quality of a child’s education depend . . . ultimately upon the
pocketbook of his parents.”  Henceforth, the court held that the financing
system did not survive strict scrutiny because it was not necessary to the
attainment of any compelling state interest.145  What seemed like a simple
solution to a nationwide problem was quickly struck down by the United
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States Supreme Court in the landmark school financing case, San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.146
i.  The Roadblock Set By Rodriguez
In Rodriguez, parents of students in an urban school district in San
Antonio brought a class action suit on behalf of all school children who
resided in poor areas with low property tax bases, alleging that Texas’s school
financing system was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution.147  Under the state’s current finance system,
Edgewood, the plaintiffs’ school district, raised twenty-six dollars per student
through property taxes.148  This number can be compared with $333 per
student produced in Alamo Heights, the most affluent school district in San
Antonio.149  After state and federal funds were contributed, these amounts
shifted to totals of $356 per pupil in Edgewood and $594 per pupil in Alamo
Heights.150
The district court, relying on decisions by the Supreme Court dealing with
the rights of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal process151 and wealth
discrimination and the right to vote,152 concluded that wealth is a suspect
class.153  It also reasoned, relying on the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the
importance of education,154 that education is a fundamental right.155
Consequently, the district court held that Texas’s finance system
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discriminated on the basis of wealth and was unconstitutional.156  The
Supreme Court disagreed.157
The United States Supreme Court distinguished prior wealth
discrimination cases by noting that the district court, in assuming that the
school system discriminates on the basis of wealth simply because some
people receive a less expensive education than others, largely ignored the
“threshold questions [of] . . . whether it makes a difference . . . that the class
of disadvantaged ‘poor’ cannot be identified . . . and whether the
relative—rather than absolute—nature of the asserted deprivation is of
significant consequence.”158  In other words, since the finance system does not
discriminate against any definable category of indigent persons and since it
does not result in a complete deprivation of any benefit, the disadvantaged
group is not a suspect class.
Next, the Court addressed the question of whether education is a
fundamental right.  It stated that deciding whether something is a fundamental
right requires determining whether such right can be explicitly or implicitly
found in the Constitution.159  Without further explanation, the court held that
“[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected.”160  And with that, education finance litigation alleging
violations of the United States Constitution, was essentially put to rest.
ii.  The Battle at the State Level
After the decision in Rodriguez foreclosed the possibility of education
being declared a fundamental right under the United States Constitution,
litigants tried again at the state level, basing their arguments on state
constitutions.161
In light of the failure of school finance litigation to improve schools
across the board, school litigation proceeded to suits alleging the right to a
minimum level of education.162  This wave of education cases focuses on
whether or not education is a fundamental right under a particular state’s
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constitution and, if so, whether students have a cause of action for
“educational malpractice” when the state’s schools fail to educate them.163
The degree of success litigants will achieve in adequacy suits may depend on
the language in their state constitution.  A state constitution that lays out
detailed expectations for the state’s education system is an efficient tool in
this type of litigation.164  State standards vary from “high quality,”165 and
“efficient system of high quality,”166 to “suitable.”167  The “specific qualitative
phrases” used in a state’s constitution may effect the success litigants will
have in seeking improved education.168  Even if plaintiffs can establish that
they have the right to a minimal level of education, what steps can the court
take to ensure students receive an adequate education?
iii.  Kansas:  A Model for Change
In 1992 Kansas enacted the School District Finance and Quality
Performance Act (SDF/QPA),169 legislation which dramatically altered the
state’s finance system and has come a long way toward creating an equal
educational system.170  The early stages of the Act were spearheaded by one
man, Judge Terry Bullock.171  Judge Bullock had a case before him which
challenged the constitutionality of the state’s current school finance system,
Mock v. Kansas.172  In Mock, a consolidated case, taxpayers from several
districts were merely seeking changes to certain parts of the school financing
system, not the whole thing.  For example, one district challenged the state’s
weighting formulas and another challenged part of the state legislation that
capped relief at a certain amount.173  Once Judge Bullock realized that the
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entire state’s finance system would need to be addressed, he organized a
summit in which members of the judiciary, legislature, and executive branch
would convene.  The alignment of the branches was an unusual event that
likely contributed to the quick enactment of the SDF/QPA.
The statute operates quite simply.  There is a statutorily set “base state aid
per pupil,” meaning “an amount of state financial aid per pupil.”174  For
example, in 1992 that amount was $3,600 per pupil.175  The amount of state
aid a school district will actually receive depends upon that district’s “local
effort.”176 “Local effort” means the amount a school district raises from its
property taxes,177 which are set uniformly in all districts.178  If a given district
cannot raise the required $3,600 per student, then the state provides the rest.179
If a district has raised funds in excess of $3,600 it will not be entitled to
general state aid.180  At that point, with each student having equal funding,
weighting factors are applied to account for disparities in each district.181  In
1992, the six weighting factors applied were transportation, vocational
education, bilingual education, at-risk pupils, low enrollment and school
facilities.182  The base numbers are then adjusted upward according to a set
formula.183
The SDF/QPA’s effect on the Kansas education system was remarkable.
In 1992, school district budgets increased by $154 million.184  Further,
discrepancies in school funding from one school district to the next decreased
dramatically.  For example, in 1991 “per-pupil expenditures ranged [from one
district to the next] from $2,700 to nearly $12,000.”185  However, by 1996,
weighted expenditures were only ranging from $3,411 to $4,532 per pupil.186
But despite this seemly positive outcome, not everyone in Kansas was happy.
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Seventeen of the state’s over three hundred school districts challenged the
SDF/QPA in four separate suits, which were consolidated.187  Plaintiffs
asserted over twelve separate grounds on which the Act could be struck down
including infringement upon local school boards’ authority and violations of
due process through excessive taking of property.188  The state supreme court
unanimously upheld all provisions of the Act and observed that “the
legislature decided to boldly go where Kansas has never gone before.  If
experience establishes that the Act needs further revision, the legislature will
have ample opportunity to do so . . . .”189  The court, in following the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez,190 “rejected the proposition that
education is a fundamental right in Kansas or that any suspect classifications
were implicated by the funding disparities.”191  The use of Rodriguez is
noteworthy because the plaintiffs in Rodriguez were arguing that they had a
constitutional right to a minimal level of education, where plaintiffs in the
Kansas case, were arguing just the opposite:  that the SDF/QPA was
unconstitutional because it set a maximum level of education.
All three branches of the Kansas state government managed to work
together to overhaul the education system and create equality among its
students.  But this occurrence is unlikely to work as well in other states for
several reasons.  First, the language of Kansas’s Constitution requires the
legislature to provide “suitable finance for the educational interests of the
state.”192  The constitution’s explicit reference to the state’s financing system
gave both the court and the legislature leverage to declare the current scheme
unsuitable and to create one that was suitable.  In addition to the help from the
constitution, Kansas itself is uniquely situated as it is not burdened with a lot
of impoverished urban areas.193  As discussed above, because of the large
disparities that usually exist between urban and rural areas, a simple funding
scheme like the SDF/QPA may not work as well in other states, particularly
those with large urban areas.  Urban schools would need so much more money
than rural ones just to balance out, that rural districts may well have a better
case for unconstitutional takings.
2004] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OR EDUCATION REFORM 681
194. Goodman, supra note 117, at 379.  Expenditures are approximately $8,000 per student, where
the national average is approximately $6,000 per student.  Id.
195. Id.
Though the Kansas scheme is a good example of what can be
accomplished when groups with different interests come together and produce
a solution that meets their individual needs, it could have been taken one step
further to produce complete success.  If the parents and taxpayers had
participated in the summit and in the production of the legislation, it is
possible that a mutually agreeable solution would have been reached, thus
eliminating the need for litigation.  Nonetheless, the positive effect of
solutions created by a group, rather than just an individual can be seen in the
way the Kansas Supreme Court supported the Act (and the legislature) in its
decision on the Act’s constitutionality.  Had the court simply deferred to the
legislature in the first place, instead of calling a summit, the solution the
legislature proposed may not have been mutually agreeable and thus could
have sparked a hostile reaction by the state’s supreme court.
Despite the success that Kansas has seen in reforming its education
finance scheme, the long term success of increased funding may not solve all
of the problems that failing schools face.  Some studies suggest that unlimited
amounts of money may not help students learn any better.  For example, the
District of Columbia public school system has the highest per pupil
expenditures in the country,194 but student performance on standardized tests
is among the worst in the country.195  However, the effects of adequate
funding cannot be ignored altogether.  Inevitably, students with books will
learn to read better than students without books; and students with lab
equipment will learn the fundamentals of chemistry better than those without
equipment.  Equalized funding may be an important brick in the foundation
of a solid education system, but it cannot stand alone.
IV.  NARROWING THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP
In a perfect world, every student would have the same quality education
and each student would learn the same way.  But unfortunately, even if each
student is given the same opportunity on its face, there are disparities that lie
beneath the surface that are only benefiting few.  In terms of achieving a racial
balance at the university level, “[a]rguably, a more certain way to ensure that
black applicants gain admission to colleges and graduate schools is to narrow
the gap between their [standardized] test scores and the test scores of white
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applicants.”196  Asa G. Hilliard, III, an expert in the area of cultural bias in
standardized tests, neatly sums up the problem:
Test makers assume that there is a common body of academic content to which every
child has been or ought to have been exposed.  Since this is not the case, the generic
word ‘achievement’ should be qualified in some way if it is to have scientific meaning.
Yet, those who develop tests for profit would find it nearly impossible to admit to the
diversity that exists in the human experience.197
Hilliard also suggests the use of four criteria that should be considered as part
of the development of such achievement tests.  First, the content of the tests
should match the content of the curriculum that students are taught.198  This
may seem like an obvious thing to consider, but as Hilliard remarks, “[u]ntil
recently, the United States has permitted, even encouraged, a wide diversity
in curricular offerings.”199  A school’s curriculum is set by the local
government, not the federal government,200 meaning that there can be great
discrepancies in what students in one state learn compared to what students
in a neighboring state learn.  However, the achievement of these students is
often measured by the same test.  A second criterion that Hilliard suggests is
the assurance that achievement tests are racially neutral.201  Some proposed
solutions to this problem include broadening the sample of students upon
which standardized tests are created and requiring a more diverse board of test
writers and reviewers.202  The third criterion suggested builds off the second
by requiring tests to include representative samples of the population.203  This
would ensure minorities are included in test samples.  Finally, Hilliard
suggests that the tests should take a student’s “relative access to knowledge
into consideration.”204  As it stands, achievement tests conclude that if a child
does not score well, that that child did not master the information taught to
him, when in reality, the quality of instruction that students receive varies
greatly from school to school.
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If one takes the discrepancies in standardized testing described above at
face value, it is no wonder that race-based affirmative action programs are
needed at the university level.  More troublesome, however, is what could
occur if these discrepancies are not resolved and race is not taken into account
in college admissions.  Without changes in the cultural biases that exist in the
nation’s curriculum and in standardized testing, levels of minority enrollment
in universities will likely drop back to where they were pre-Bakke, especially
if heavy reliance is placed on standardized tests like the SAT, MCAT, or
LSAT.205
Though an overnight solution is unlikely to occur, a close examination of
the curriculum chosen, standardized testing, and learning methods may be a
start.206  In addition, some strategies that have been successful to date have
been reducing class size,207 creating structured reading programs, emphasizing
cognitive skills in pre-school and strengthening the academic abilities of
teachers.208
V.  SOLUTIONS
The different aspects of the nation’s education system:  finance, choice,
establishing minimum standards, and closing the achievement gap, cannot be
dealt with separately in order to completely fix any school district’s problems,
but rather must be considered together.  Such a holistic approach requires the
initiative and cooperation of all branches of a state’s government in addition
to parents, students, teachers, and any other members of the community that
are likely to have a stake in the outcome.  This approach was almost
accomplished in Kansas, but the failure to include more members of the
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community in forming the solution has resulted in a faction of the population
seeking to change the legislation in place.209
Building on the holistic approach is another approach that I have labeled
the “tiered approach.”  This approach utilizes the combined efforts of both
community and government, but is modeled after the social science concept
known as Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.210  Maslow’s Hierarchy is divided
into five levels of needs.  They are (in ascending order):  (1) physiological; (2)
safety; (3) belonging; (4) esteem; and (5) self-actualization.211  The premise
of the theory is that a person will not seek to meet a higher level of need until
the ones below it are met.  For example, “[y]ou can’t motivate someone to
achieve their sales target (level 4) when they’re having problems with their
marriage (level 3).”212  Additionally, “[y]ou can’t expect someone to work as
a team member (level 3) when they’re having their house re-possessed (level
2).”213
The Hierarchy has already found its way into the education arena in the
special education context.214  But it can also be used as a blueprint for parents,
teachers and community groups who are seeking education reform.  The group
seeking change can look to the Hierarchy to determine what needs, if any, are
currently being met.  The Hierarchy, of course, could be modified to meet the
specific needs of an educational community.  For example, the Hierarchy may
begin with basic needs consisting of structurally sound schools, adequate
books, and effective teaching techniques, and then move up to achieving
culturally accurate standardized testing, and finally, balancing diversity and
minority achievement at the university level.  When used in conjunction with
the holistic method (including all affected members of the community in
decision-making) this approach may be just as, or even possibly more,
effective than the litigation techniques described in the previous parts of this
Note.
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VI.  CONCLUSION
As the possibility of the extinction of current affirmative action programs
looms near, it is of utmost importance for the entire nation to reanalyze the
current educational system.  Achieving diversity at the university level is more
important now than ever, but cannot be best achieved by temporary solutions
applied at the admissions stage.  Instead of dealing with the problem of poor
education at the college level, legislators, judges, parents, teachers, and
students should be examining more creative ways to prevent poor education
in the first place.  If the citizens of this country decide that diversity is
important we must also be willing to provide educational opportunities for all
children that, while unlikely to ever be equal, are at the very least not
substandard and achieve some defined minimal level designed to prepare them
for the future.  Uneducated or undereducated children grow up to be
uneducated or undereducated adults.  The effects of illiteracy on this country
cannot be ignored.  “The Commerce Department estimates that the United
States suffers a productivity loss of between $140 billion and $300 billion
annually that is directly traceable to adult worker illiteracy.”215  Furthermore,
inadequate education may lead to increased health care costs216 and higher
prison costs.217  But most importantly, inadequate education opportunities at
the primary school level place unnecessary obstacles in the path of every
child’s future.
